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Abstract
Theories of mobilization suggest that groups are more likely to resort to violence in the presence of political opportunity struc-
tures that afford greater prospects for extracting concessions from the government or better opportunities to topple ruling gov-
ernments. However, existing efforts to consider the possible influences of political opportunity structures on incentives for
violence and civil war empirically have almost invariably relied upon measures of democracy to proxy for the hypothesized
mechanisms, most notably the argument that the opposing effects of political accommodation and repression will give rise to
an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and the risk of civil war. The authors detail a number of problems with
measures of democracy as proxies for political opportunity structures and develop alternative measures based on the likely risks
that political leaders will lose power in irregular challenges and their implications for the incentives for resort to violence. The
authors evaluate empirically how the security with which leaders hold office influences the prospects of violent civil conflict. The
findings indicate that recent irregular leader entry and transitions indeed increase the risk of conflict onset, while democratic
institutions are found to decrease the risk of civil war, after controlling for the new measures of state weakness.
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Introduction
The salience of civil war in the contemporary world has gener-
ated a great deal of scholarly interest in its causes. The theore-
tical literature on civil war has postulated a variety of possible
explanations for why governments and insurgents may resort
to violence against one another. Some researchers highlight the
role of grievances as the underlying motives for insurgency or
protest, where the specific grievances can arise from issues such
as poverty or economic deprivation, ethnic exclusion, lack of
political rights and civil liberties, or frustrated aspirations or
a gap between the actual social and economic status of actors
and their expectations (see e.g. Buhaug, Cederman & Rød,
2008; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Others emphasize condi-
tions that can help facilitate mobilization among potential
insurgents, including the role of private benefits or incentives
from conflict and the role of state strength in increasing the
costs of protests and deterring potential insurgents from
launching violent attacks (see e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004;
Fearon & Laitin 2003; Hironaka, 2005; Tilly, 1978). In turn,
empirical research on civil war has considered a variety of mea-
sures intended to reflect either grievances that could give rise to
motives for protest or opportunities for resort to violence (see
e.g. Sambanis, 2002, 2004, for useful reviews).
In this article, we revisit arguments about how democracy,
state strength, and the notion of political opportunity struc-
tures can influence civil war and insurgent violence. We argue
that it is important to consider theoretically the distinct
impacts of repressive and accommodative forms of state capac-
ity on the prospects for conflict, as well as the difference
between persistent structural features that can enable or pre-
vent conflicts and the more dynamic events that can make
conflict more likely in certain periods. Many of the indicators
used in empirical studies of civil war are relatively crude indi-
cators of the underlying concepts and only loosely related to
the theoretical rationale. Moreover, since the same operational
measures are used as indicators for a large number of quite dif-
ferent concepts, it is often very difficult to discriminate
between different interpretations and theories from the
empirical results alone. We focus on the role of political
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institutions and conflict, and highlight the problems in using
degree of democracy as a combined proxy for grievances and
state strength or repressive capacity, as well as taking changes
in degree of democracy as an indicator of political opportunity
structures. We argue that measures of the degree to which
political institutions are democratic provide a poor indicator
of state strength, and highlight the need to seek separate mea-
sures of the ability of democratic institutions to encourage sub-
stitution to nonviolent political means and forms of political
weakness that may encourage violence rather than to focus
on their combined implications. We develop alternative mea-
sures of state weakness based on irregular leader changes and
the likelihood that leaders will be vulnerable to challenges from
contenders seeking political power or concessions. Our
empirical results suggest that greater state weakness, as mea-
sured by irregular leader changes, indeed does appear to be
associated with civil war onset. Moreover, we find that the risk
of civil war depends upon factors influencing the anticipated
state weakness as assessed by the risk of irregular leader
changes. Although leaders that have entered irregularly can
encourage civil war onset, as they are more likely to be suscep-
tible to challenges and therefore more likely to make conces-
sions to insurgents, the risk declines with longer tenure.
Once we control for these measures of political weakness,
we find that democracy has a clear negative effect on the risk
of civil conflict onset, in line with what we would expect from
theories stressing the role of political accommodation and
opportunities for nonviolent activities.
Mobilization and civil war: State strength,
repressive capacity, and political democracy
The current literature on civil war has to a large extent focused
on identifying structural government or country characteristics
that can make countries more or less prone to civil war. For
example, the inverse relationship between a country’s per
capita income and civil war and the positive association
between country size and civil war are often cited as key
empirical facts in reviews on what we know about civil war (see
e.g. Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). Although research on such
country-level propositions has provided many useful insights
about civil war, the near exclusive focus on structural features
of countries at large or the government side has led to a relative
neglect of the role of non-state actors in civil wars. Theories of
civil war remind us that conflict is at least a minimally dyadic
phenomenon (see Boulding, 1963; Most & Starr, 1989). As
such, understanding civil war requires us to consider how
interactions between governments and non-state actors give
rise to violence rather than to focus exclusively on the attri-
butes of one actor in isolation (see e.g. Buhaug, Cederman
& Rød, 2008; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009).
Although the current literature on civil war emphasizes pri-
marily country-level or government characteristics, the earlier
literature on violent protest and revolutions preceding the cur-
rent wave of studies on civil war tended to emphasize the role
of participants and mobilization, and the situations in which
individuals decide whether to participate in protest or not.
Many underlying grievances are either ubiquitous or constant
features that change only very slowly over time. So-called polit-
ical opportunity structure theories tend to highlight the role of
specific changes or events that may provide windows of oppor-
tunity for protesters in achieving collective action or capitalize
on weaknesses on the government side (see e.g. McAdam,
1982; Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1994). More specifically, events
or changes that decrease the deterrent capacity of the state or
make it easier for individuals to achieve collective action
should help in providing a more dynamic element for under-
standing the timing of protest. Most of the literature on mobi-
lization has focused on the role of an observed decline in state
strength as an indicator of political opportunity structures (see
e.g. Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1978), although one can also imag-
ine forms of windows of opportunity that make it easier for
insurgents to achieve mobilization, such as instances where
dissatisfaction is revealed to be greater than commonly
thought, and protests can rely on existing networks (see e.g.
Chwe, 1999; Opp, Voss & Gern, 1995), or the potential role
of innovative entrepreneurs or organizers that help overcome
previous obstacles (e.g. Lichbach, 1995).
Theories of political opportunity structures have been
developed primarily to understand social movements and non-
violent protest, but the idea that dynamic changes in state
weakness or political opportunities can encourage mobiliza-
tion has clear relevance for the risk of civil war as well. Civil
war does not originate in a vacuum, and potential insurgents
are likely to consider their anticipated prospects of achieving
something by resort to violence. Everything else being equal,
one would expect weaker states to be more likely to become
targeted, either because the insurgents have an opportunity
to seize political power directly through toppling the govern-
ment, or because weaker governments that are vulnerable to
challenges from other competitors – whether these are oppos-
ing factors or individuals within a ruling coalition – will be
more likely to offer some form of accommodation to insur-
gents (see e.g. Rasler, 1996, on the case of Iran).
However, although arguments about ‘state strength’ or
‘political opportunities’ play an important role in many
accounts of conflict movements, it is much less clear how one
would operationalize these concepts, in particular in a cross-
national setting. Meyer & Minkoff (2004) note that many
conceptual discussions of political opportunities tend to leave
issues of operationalization unspecified, and that many of the
measures suggested in empirical studies tend to be highly idio-
syncratic and context specific. For example, McAdam’s (1982)
measure of political opportunities for African American
groups, based on the decline in lynchings in the American
South, cannot easily be generalized to other settings. Likewise,
despite the theoretical prominence of the concept of state
capacity in studies of civil war, there is no consensus on how
it may be measured (see Hendrix, 2010), and most existing
applications focus on enduring structural features rather than
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more dynamic changes. In perhaps the best-known example
from civil war studies, Fearon & Laitin (2003), for example,
use GDP per capita as an indicator of state strength. However,
this is at best a very indirect measure. Although wealthier states
may tend to be generally stronger, the example of North Korea
attests to how not all poor states necessarily can be character-
ized as weak states, and theories of the resource curse point to
how an increase in income actually can decrease state strength
and the governability of countries through the distorting
effects of wealth on rent-seeking and other disruptive activities
(see e.g. Auty, 1993; Ron, 2005; Ross, 2004). Finally, GDP
per capita has been used as an indicator of a number of quite
different concepts by other researchers. Collier & Hoeffler
(2004), for example, see higher GDP per capita as an indicator
of the opportunity costs of conflict, and GDP per capita could
also be seen as an indicator of economic grievances among
potential insurgents rather than a measure of state strength (see
Mack, 2008). Although many studies have demonstrated a
relationship between GDP per capita and conflict, it is difficult
to evaluate the relative merits of different arguments that all
invoke the same empirical proxy measure.
Another tradition in the literature on political violence and
civil war has approached the issue of state strength through
measures of political institutions. Lack of freedom, political
rights, and opportunities for political participation can on the
one hand be seen as an obvious cause of grievances, which may
motivate resort to violence against a government (e.g. Gurr,
1970; Schnytzer, 1994). This suggests that we should gener-
ally observe greater potential for insurgencies under autocratic
regimes. By contrast, many have argued that democracies
afford greater opportunities for groups to pursue their
aims by nonviolent political means, and hence provide
plausible substitutes for violence (see Eisinger, 1973; Sandler,
Tschirhart & Cauley, 1983). However, other researchers have
pointed out how autocracies are likely to respond to dissent
with harsh repression (e.g. Davenport, 1995), and that coun-
tries with greater political openness may find it difficult to
respond forcefully to violent conflict. Moreover, since regimes
with high repressive capacity should be better able to deter
conflict (e.g. Lichbach, 1995; Tullock, 1971), some research-
ers have argued the relationship between degree of democracy
and the risk of conflict will be non-linear and non-monotonic,
owing to the countervailing influences of declining repressive-
ness and greater opportunities for nonviolent political avenues.
More specifically, the relationship between degree of democ-
racy and risk of conflict should take the shape of an
inverted-U, with the greatest risk of violence among semi-
democratic countries that combine insufficient repressiveness
to deter violence and insufficient political openness to induce
substitution to nonviolent activities (see e.g. Hegre et al.,
2001; Hibbs, 1973; Muller & Weede, 1990).
Many studies have indeed found evidence that seem consis-
tent with the inverted U-curve argument. However, this line
of research seems problematic for a number of reasons. First,
degree of democracy is used here to proxy for two opposing
trends, namely the repressive capacity of undemocratic states
and the accommodative capacity of more democratic regimes.
Instead of considering the hypothesized joint implications of
the two opposing trends in terms of degree of democracy, it
would be desirable to have direct measures of repressive capac-
ity or state strength separate from the extent to which democ-
racy facilitates substitution to nonviolent political means or
strategies. We will detail one possible alternative based on
information on political leaders and how they enter office.
Second, tests of the inverted U-curve arguments have typi-
cally relied on the Polity data, which provide a 21-point scale
indicating a country’s degree of democracy based on institu-
tional characteristics. Although many studies appear to find
evidence that the risk of civil war seems highest for countries
with values in the middle of this scale, this finding may follow
partly from construction. In particular, Polity contains a large
number of observations where we do not see regular values on
the subcomponents that make up the overall Polity scale, since
institutional characteristics could not be classified according to
the coding protocol. More precisely, observations are given a
special code during periods of ‘foreign interruption’ (–66),
cases of ‘interregnum’ (–77), defined by Gurr, Jaggers &
Moore (1989: 6) as periods ‘in which there is a complete
collapse of central political authority’, or periods of ‘transition’
(–88) where institutional characteristics presumably are unclear
or undergoing significant changes. The Polity project has
recently released versions of the data where the researchers
implement a set of imputations to replace these special codes.
More specifically, Marshall & Jaggers (2005) suggest replacing
cases of interregnum with a Polity score of 0, linearly interpo-
lating transition periods, and setting periods of foreign inter-
ruption to missing values. The first imputation procedure is
potentially highly problematic, since countries may be coded
as being in an ‘interregnum’ precisely because of conflict and
violence (as noted by Gurr, Jaggers & Moore, 1989: 6), rather
than their institutions being somehow ‘in-between’ democracy
and autocracy. Moreover, although linear interpolation may
be a reasonable strategy for dealing with missing data on slowly
moving features, existing research shows that that political
transitions rarely follow such a smooth pattern of change over
time (see Lichbach, 1984).
Third, Vreeland (2008) suggests that the Polity data are
problematic in testing arguments about institutions and civil
war since two of the subcomponents in the Polity scale –
namely, the Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP)
and the Regulation of Political Participation (PARREG) – can
acquire particular values based on whether a country experi-
ences civil war. In particular, PARREG can take on a value
of 1 in the event of ‘unregulated participation’, or a situation
where there is no systematic control of political activity, or
a value of 2 for ‘factional’ polities, with restricted patterns
of competition between competing factions. However, Gurr,
Jaggers & Moore (1989: 12) explicitly note that ‘unregulated
participation’ could entail ‘violent conflict among partisan
groups’, and that ‘factionalism’ is characterized by ‘intense,
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hostile, and frequently violent’ competition, which in extreme
cases ‘may be manifested in the establishment of rival govern-
ments and in civil war’. Likewise, PARCOMP is coded as 0 in
cases deemed ‘not applicable’ or ‘unregulated competition’ or
1 for ‘factional competition’, which may reflect situations
where a country experiences civil war.1 Vreeland (2008) argues
that using these coding criteria risks introducing an inverted
U-shape by construction, and shows that none of the other
subcomponents of the Polity index appear to display the
hypothesized inverted U-shaped pattern with conflict.2
Finally, ‘anocratic’ polities that have values in the middle
range of the Polity scale are often countries in transition, on
the way to either democracy or autocracy, and tend to be less
persistent than clear autocracies or democracies (see Gleditsch
&Ward, 1997; Gurr, 1974).3 Many have argued that political
transitions themselves may influence the risk of violent con-
flict, and it can be difficult to separate the potential impact
of transitions from the impact of anocratic polities per se
(Gleditsch, 2002a; Hegre et al., 2001). More generally, looking
at data on degree of democracy alone provides at best a partial
indication of political change and its potential impact on con-
flict. Any measure that identifies whether countries are democ-
racies treats non-democracies as a residual category, where
regimes essentially are defined by what they are not. This risks
lumping together many quite disparate regimes as non-
democracies, including socialist states such as the Soviet Union
and kleptocracies such as Zaire under Mobutu. Gleditsch &
Choung (2008) note how major political transitions such as
the Iranian and Cuban revolutions do not show up as large
changes in the Polity data, since the countries remained
‘non-democracies’ institutionally.
Leader entry and stability as measures of political
opportunities
Our arguments about the importance of distinguishing
between political opportunity structures as phases and more
enduring features of state strength and the desirability of sep-
arate measures for political accommodation and repressive
capacity are unlikely to be controversial. So far, however, we
have said little about how these challenges may be overcome.
In this section, we expand on how information on leaders can
help provide independent measures to assess state strength and
political opportunities for potential challengers or violent pro-
testers, separate from measures of the degree to which political
institutions are democratic.
Before turning to the specific measures we propose, we first
outline in greater detail the mechanisms linking the security
with which leaders hold office to the risk of civil war. We have
previously argued that challengers and rebels are strategic, and
more likely to resort to violence when they stand a higher
chance of achieving some success. As such, we would expect
that weaker governments and leaders, vulnerable to challenges
from competitors, would be more likely to encourage resort to
insurgent violence. Whether a government is ‘weak’ is some-
times classified based on whether regimes in the end turn out
to fall or not. However, this is a post hoc classification that can
only be made after the fact. Moreover, it is not necessary for a
leader to actually ultimately fall to encourage aggression, and
concessions to insurgents may under some circumstances suf-
fice to prevent violent conflict. Although whether leaders fail
cannot be known with certainty ex ante, we would still expect
that insurgents can recognize instances when leaders are likely
to be weak and more likely to offer concessions. Moreover,
there are clear empirically observable relationships between
certain ex ante observable leader characteristics and resulting
political stability that we can use to identify such opportunity
structures.
Ethiopia provides a good example illustrating how state
instability and periods of weakness can encourage resort to vio-
lence. In Ethiopia, the Marxist Derg successfully overthrew
Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. Although the
coup makers certainly succeeded in overthrowing the previous
government, the situation after the coup saw considerable
instability as different factions and individuals within the Derg
vied for political power and control. The first two heads of
state after the coup – Aman Andom and Tafari Benti – were
both forcefully removed from power and killed during the
struggle. During this period, a number of other groups stepped
up their challenges against the government through violent
means, including Marxist groups as well as ethnically based
insurgencies seeking autonomy for various non-Amhara
groups. In the Uppsala armed conflict data, the Ethiopian Peo-
ple’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the Oromi Liberation Front
(OLF), and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
are all considered to be involved in a civil war beginning on
1 January 1976. Many of these organizations predated the tur-
moil at the center of the state, yet the timing of the increase in
mobilization and the outbreak of the conflict in its aftermath
suggests that the groups responded to these changes. Although
it is difficult to establish whether this conflict would not have
happened in the absence of a weakened central government,
the turmoil in the wake of the coup and infighting within the
new leadership seems to have encouraged other actors to inten-
sify their campaigns against the government, eventually lead-
ing to a full-fledged civil war (see De Waal, 1991).
1 These definitions might seem to imply that PARREG and PARCOMP in
these cases must have the same values, but this is not the case in the
observed data. Although PARREG ¼ 1 implies that PARCOMP ¼ 0, the
reverse is not the case. Moreover, PARCOMP ¼ 1 actually implies that
PARREG ¼ 4 (‘restricted’) and only 6% of observations with PARREG ¼
2 have PARCOMP ¼ 1.
2 From a different perspective, Treier & Jackman (2008) argue that the
problem of measurement error in the Polity data makes it difficult to
evaluate non-linear relationships with other outcomes of interest.
3 Gurr (1974: 1487) introduced the term ‘anocratic’ to denote regimes lacking
centralized political power and institutionalization. The term is commonly
used to denote regimes with a Polity score above –6 and below 6, or
regimes with ‘a mix of institutional characteristics, some democratic and
others . . . authoritarian’ (Vreeland, 2008: 404).
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To what extent can such instances of state weakness and
leaders likely to suffer challenges be identified empirically? The
Archigos data, developed by Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza
(2009), detail the specific manner in which leaders enter into
and leave political office. Leaders may enter power in a regular
manner, in accordance with prevailing rules and practices, or
in an irregular manner, relative to existing rules. The former
may include gaining power through elections, in a competitive
democratic system, or designation by the incumbent leader
(e.g. Papa Doc handing over power to Baby Doc), or a com-
mittee with the authority to appoint a successor in autocratic
systems (e.g. the leadership of a single party or Politburo).
Leaders may also enter power in an irregular fashion, for exam-
ple by seizing power through a coup or a violent overthrow of
the previous leader, as in a military coup or the Iranian
revolution.
In this article, we examine the positive effect of revealed
political opportunity structures by examining whether civil
conflict onset is more likely in the wake of irregular regime
changes, that is, situations where one leader first leaves power
by irregular means and a new leader assumes power by irregu-
lar means. To restate our discussion more formally as a
hypothesis, we expect that irregular transitions can encourage
resort to violence and hence should yield a higher risk of civil
war onset (H1), as such observed transitions signal windows of
opportunity and state weakness.
It may be argued that irregular leader transitions and civil
war may be endogenous or influenced by common causes.
Moreover, the risk of civil war can increase when there is a per-
ceived risk that leaders will be vulnerable to challenges, irre-
spective of whether we ultimately see a transition or not. As
such, we will consider two alternative approaches to the
hypotheses on the effect of observed irregular transitions. First,
we will consider the possibility that instances with a high pre-
dicted risk of irregular transitions are more likely to see conflict
(H2), based on ex ante observable characteristics. Second, we
will consider whether the irregular entry of a current leader, as
an observable proxy for the risk of irregular exit, increases the
risk of conflict onset. Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza (2009)
show that the manner in which a leader enters office is strongly
related to how leaders lose office. Leaders who have entered
power irregularly are over three times more likely to leave
office in an irregular manner, and irregular exit is the modal
form of exit for leaders who have entered power irregularly.
The strong relationship between mode of entry and expected
mode of exit for a leader makes the mode of entry a suitable
predetermined indicator of how the risk of irregular transitions
may influence civil war (see also Lacina, 2007). However, it
would be unreasonable to expect that mode of entry should
have a constant effect on conflict, irrespective of the duration
of a leader’s tenure or time since the irregular entry. Rather, we
would expect the impact of irregular entry to decay with time
in office. For example, although Fidel Castro entered power
irregularly, the length of his rule beyond the initial years
should suffice to demonstrate the strength of his position.
Goemans & Bas (2006) show that the negative impact of
irregular leader entry on economic growth declines with time,
making leaders who have entered regularly and irregularly
essentially indistinguishable after an initial window. As such,
we examine the impact of irregular entry and how this varies
with time, and we expect that leaders who have entered power
by irregular means will have a high likelihood of conflict, but
that the positive effect of initial irregular entry will dissipate
with longer tenure, as these leaders become more secure in
office (H3).
Finally, we also reconsider the effects of democracy, once
we have taken into account the effects of political opportunity
structures through leader weakness and the potential problems
with the Polity scale. More specifically, we will consider sepa-
rately the components of the Polity scale that may underlie the
inverted U-shape, more specifically the irregular Polity values
(–66,–77,–88) and the values of PARCOMP and PARREG
that may reflect conflict. We expect that when we control for
the revealed state weakness determined by the coding of these
categories and partition out observations with these specific
values on the Polity scale, we should find that greater degrees
of democracy should have a negative monotonic relationship
with civil war (H4).
Empirical analysis
Our unit of analysis is the state-year, for all independent coun-
tries from 1946 to 2004.We chose the country-year as the nat-
ural unit of analysis as most of our data are available at a yearly
level only, although we have more fine-grained data for some
characteristics such as leaders, political institutional changes,
and conflict.
Data and measures
Our measure of conflict is based on the Uppsala/PRIO Armed
Conflict Data (see Gleditsch et al., 2002). More specifically,
our dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a state
experiences the onset of intrastate conflict claiming more than
25þ deaths in a calendar year. Since we are only interested in
new conflicts breaking out, we exclude observations with sub-
sequent years of the same conflict.4
Our measure of irregular transitions is taken from the
Archigos data. We use Archigos to identify whether the leader
in power entered irregularly and the tenure of a leader, mea-
sured in days at the end of the year. Not all leader changes
imply political transitions, and we identify irregular transitions
or alterations between distinct coalitions in autocratic regimes
in instances where a leader leaves power irregularly and a new
leader enters irregularly within a 12-month period. We focus
4 We furthermore exclude short lulls in fighting and do not code new onsets
when there is an interval of less than two years between two periods of a
violent conflict. However, onsets of new civil wars are included as onset,
even if there is another ongoing conflict.
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on both exit and entry to avoid situations where a leader is
forced to give up power but a constitutionally or designated
successor then assumes power in a regular manner.5 There can
also be cases where an outgoing leader may exit in a regular
manner, but a new leader enters irregularly. Many monarchies,
for example, have unclear lines of succession, with the conse-
quences that the exit of one leader may give way to instability
as contenders vie for power (hence the phrase ‘long live the
King’). However, irregular entry is here partly a function of
lack of a clear manner of succession, and the new entrants tend
to be closely associated with the previous leader. We thus pre-
fer to err on the side of caution and not count these as irregular
transitions among autocracies, although they will be counted
as irregular leader entries where conflict then may follow in the
wake of leader changes.6
We use the Polity data to measure the extent to which a
country has political institutions that can be characterized as
democratic. Unlike the recommendation of the Polity project,
we do not impute a value of 0 for ‘interregnum’ or linearly
interpolate cases ‘in transition’. The predicted value for these
polities based on alternative data sources such as the Freedom
House data suggest values very close to –10 or most autocratic
end of the scale, and we assign these observations a value of
–10 instead. We also introduce separate dummy variables
identifying observations with irregular Polity values to see if
these differ in their expected influence on civil war. Finally,
we introduce dummy variables for observations with the values
of PARREG and PARCOMP seen as problematic by Vreeland
as they may be influenced by whether countries experience
conflict.
We also include a number of relevant control variables
based on existing studies of civil war that plausibly could be
associated with our main variables of interest. First, we include
the log of GDP per capita (from Gleditsch, 2002b), which is a
potential rival measure of state strength. This is a central con-
trol variable, as political instability and state weakness poten-
tially could reflect variation in wealth and income. Second,
we include the log of population (from Gleditsch, 2002b),
as larger countries potentially could be systematically more
stable (for example, through a screening effect where weaker
states disintegrate over time) or have more opportunities for
instability because they have larger or more diverse popula-
tions. Finally, we include a count of the number of successive
years of peace since conflict or independence, whichever is
shorter, since violent conflicts often recur and the time since
the last conflict could be associated with prospects for political
instability or state weakness. Since the influence of conflict his-
tory or dependence is unlikely to be linear in the count of years
at peace, we use an exponential function exppy/a, where py
indicates the consecutive years of peace and a is a half-time
parameter. Trial and error suggested that a¼ 4 provides a rea-
sonable fit to the data. This implies that the original risk of
conflict at the end of a prior conflict is halved within three
years.7
Empirical results
We first illustrate the relationship of civil war to irregular tran-
sitions through some simple descriptive statistics. For our
annual observations, we find that as many as 31% of the obser-
vations with irregular leader transitions in the current or pre-
vious year coincide with a civil war. This compares with an
incidence rate of only 14% among the observations without
irregular regime transitions, and strongly suggests that civil
wars often go together with political turmoil or irregular tran-
sitions. However, looking at how transitions go together with
instances of civil war does not necessarily show that instability
generates a higher risk of conflict, as it is conceivable that con-
flict also may generate a higher risk of transitions. In Table I,
we restrict our attention to the initial onset of conflict, as
coded by the Uppsala armed conflict data. Table I indicates
that civil war onset is considerably more likely in instances
where we have irregular transitions. More specifically, we see
civil war onset in about 12% of all the cases with irregular tran-
sitions, compared to less than 4% of the observations where we
do not see irregular transitions.8 This supports our argument
that irregular transitions signaling state weakness and political
opportunities can increase the risk of civil war through
encouraging aggression against a regime from challengers or
protestors.
5 For example, Guatemalan President Serrano attempted a self-coup in 1993,
and suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament in an effort to fight
corruption. The self-coup was met with resistance and Serrano resigned under
pressure. However, he was replaced by his vice-president, and the new presi-
dent was hence appointed in a constitutional manner by the legislative
assembly.
6 We consider the transition dates in Archigos to exclude cases where
transitions that take place after the outbreak of a conflict (based on
Startdate2 in the Uppsala armed conflict data), since these may be the
result of conflict rather than a prior factor contributing to the outbreak, but
we retain transitions that occur simultaneously with the recorded conflict
onset date. Although conflicts are recorded as starting on a particular date
in the Uppsala data, this normally refers to the first casualties in a conflict
that eventually reaches the 25 deaths threshold, and the activities of the
organization may in some cases precede the dates (Harbom, Strand &
Nygård, 2009: 8–9).
7 We have also considered two alternative approaches for dealing with time
dependence, namely cubic spline functions of time as suggested by Beck,
Katz & Tucker (1998) or cubic polynomial of time as suggested by Carter
& Signorino (2007). We find that the latter actually fits the data less well
than our exponential function, while the former has a marginally better fit.
However, judging from standard information criteria, the increase in fit is
not commensurate to the additional loss of degrees of freedom. We thus
prefer to retain the simple exponential function as this is parsimonious and
easy to interpret, but we note that our substantive results remain similar
irrespective of the specific approach for dealing with time dependence.
8 The overrepresentation of onset in years with transitions holds even if we lag
transitions by one year, although this will exclude conflict outbreak following
transitions in the same year.
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Skeptics may question to what extent our results showing
that civil war onset tend to follow irregular transitions differ
from previous work suggesting a relationship between changes
in the Polity data and the risk of civil war. In Table II we con-
sider the relationship of civil war onset to changes in the Polity
scale that result in changes between democracies and non-
democracies, using the threshold for democracy suggested by
Jaggers & Gurr (1995).9 As can be seen from Table II, there
is some evidence that the relative share of conflict onset is
higher following transitions. In particular, transitions from
democracy to autocracy have a very high share of civil war
onset observations, although one must also consider that the
number of instances where democratic institutions break
down over this period is very limited (i.e. 46). However,
despite the large amount of work on the notion that democra-
tization entails risks of conflict (e.g. Snyder, 2000), the evi-
dence for a higher share of civil war onset is very weak for
transitions to democracy, which have only a marginally higher
share of conflict onset than years without transitions. More-
over, the number of transitions on the Polity scale (135) is
much smaller than the number of irregular transitions (253).
This again supports our claim that although changes in transi-
tions reflected in the Polity scale in many cases may tell us
something about state weakness or political opportunity struc-
tures that could encourage aggression, the Polity data are pri-
marily a measure of degree of democracy in a country’s
institutions and as such leave out a considerable amount of rel-
evant political changes and instability, especially among
autocracies.
Although suggestive, the descriptive figures and bivariate
relationships shown so far could obviously be due to third fac-
tors that influence both the risk of civil war and political
instability and leader changes. We now turn to our multivari-
ate analysis, including factors that are commonly believed to
be associated with civil war. Model 1 in Table III first presents
the results for a null model, where we do not consider the
impact of irregular transitions or the dummy flagging observa-
tions with potentially problematic Polity values due to the
coding of the subcomponents. The results for Model 1
indicate that that the irregular Polity categories of ‘interreg-
num’ (–77) and ‘in transition’ (–88) indeed are strongly posi-
tively associated with conflict. This in turn implies that
imputation techniques assigning these observations a Polity
value of 0 or values likely to be in the middle of the Polity scale
through linear interpolation can indeed generate support for a
seeming inverted U-shape for the risk of conflict by construc-
tion. The coefficient estimate for ‘foreign interruption’ (–66)
is actually negative, perhaps reflecting the fact that states with
foreign interruption may be more likely to have conflicts
involving other states that are less likely to be coded as civil
wars. However, the enormous size of the coefficient suggest
a problem of separation (see Zorn, 2005),10 and we therefore
omit this category from the remainder of the analysis.
However, even after taking into account all of the special
transition categories in the Polity data, the results still suggest
an inverted U-shaped relationship between the Polity democ-
racy scale and civil war onset, with a maximum effect when a
state has a Polity score of just above 0. Replacing the quadratic
specification with a linear term results in a positive (albeit not
statistically significant) coefficient. Hence, the inverted U-
shaped relationship between degree of democracy and conflict
onset seems to be supported by the data, even when we
account for the potential problems due to imputation of values
on Polity scale for the special categories.
Model 2 adds a term for the presence of an irregular transi-
tion in the current or prior year, as well as separate dummy
variables for observations with the potentially problematic val-
ues of the PARCOMP and PARREG subcomponents. The
results return a clear positive estimated coefficient for irregular
transitions. The coefficient estimate suggests that the log-odds
of conflict more than double when countries experience an
irregular transition in a window spanning the current and the
prior year, strongly consistent with our claim that such
instances of political instability can encourage violent conflict.
We also find support for Vreeland’s claim that certain values of
PARREG that could reflect the presence of civil war are posi-
tively associated with conflict onset. However, in the case of
PARCOMP, the potentially problematic values are actually
Table II. Civil war onset by Polity transitions
Civil war onset
No Yes
Transition to autocracy 40 (87%) 6 (13%)
No transition 6,575 (96%) 258 (4%)
Transition to democracy 82 (94%) 5 (6%)
Percentages in parentheses sum to 100 across rows.
Table I. Civil war onset by irregular transitions
Civil war onset
No Yes
No transition 6,568 (96%) 250 (4%)
Irregular transition 223 (88%) 30 (12%)
Percentages in parentheses sum to 100 across rows.
9 More specifically, countries with a Polity score of 6 and above are considered
coherent democracies. Jaggers & Gurr also distinguish between ‘coherent
autocracies’, which have Polity scores of –6 or below, and ‘anocracies’, but
we do not consider this difference among non-democracies here.
10 The problem of separation refers to cases where some predictors have little
or no variation in the response, which makes it difficult to estimate meaningful
coefficients. In this case, we only have one case of conflict onset under ‘foreign
interruption’, namely Uganda in 1979.
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negatively associated with civil conflict onset. Finally, we note
that the sign for the linear part of the Polity democracy scale
now switches sign and becomes negative. The net implied rela-
tionship between civil war is still non-monotonic given these
estimated coefficients, since negative values on the Polity scale
will be rendered positive by the quadratic term. However, the
flex point, or the specific value where the net impact on the
risk of conflict reaches its maximum value, becomes much
lower relative to Model 1, more specifically this now occurs
at a Polity value of about –2.5.
In the case of Model 1, we were unable to find support for
any effect of democracy when we replaced the quadratic speci-
fication with a linear specification, that is, just the Polity scale
without the squared values. However, as can be seen in Model
3, if we replace the quadratic specification in Model 2 with a
linear term, we now get a clear and significant negative coeffi-
cient for democracy. Hence, we find evidence consistent with
our argument about the substitution for democracy once we
partition out observations with the problematic values on the
Polity scale. Skeptics may argue that a non-linear specification
for the effects of democracy still provides a better fit to the
data, since Model 2 finds a significant estimate for the squared
term. Although a model with more terms by construction
must fit the data better, we believe that the simpler linear spe-
cification is more defensible on theoretical grounds. We do not
normally let all our terms in a regression model enter models
non-linearly, and any gain in the statistical fit of a model must
be tempered by the loss in degrees of freedom. For example,
adding the square of the log of population also increases the
statistical fit of the model, but we should clearly be skeptical
of such a specification unless it is justified on theoretical
grounds. Hence, even if the quadratic specification is statisti-
cally significant and fits the data marginally better than the lin-
ear term for democracy, the difference seems sufficiently small
that the linear form can be said to provide a reasonable, yet
more parsimonious representation of the data. Formal decision
theoretic criteria for evaluating the trade-off between fit and
parsimony likewise support the linear over the quadratic spe-
cification here.11 In sum, it seems reasonable to infer that there
is a great deal more evidence of democracy having a negative
effect on the risk of civil war onset once we take into account
the positive effects on conflict from state or leader weaknesses.
We take this to support our claim that the alleged non-
linear relationship between conflict and democracy is primarily
a result of the influence on conflict of coding of particular val-
ues for the Polity components, and it supports our argument
that greater democracy affords greater possibility for substitu-
tion to nonviolent political means than an autocracy. It is
unlikely that something about the institutions of a partial
democracy per se increases the risk of conflict, but rather
something about the ways in which a country comes to be a
partial democracy that may be associated with a higher risk
of conflict. More specifically, we know that countries classified
Table III. Logit estimates of conflict onset
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
(Intercept) 4.492 0.792 4.893 0.819 4.760 0.819
log of GDP pc 0.289 0.084 0.265 0.086 0.312 0.084
Polity 0.0003 0.012 0.035 0.019 0.048 0.017
Polity squared 0.0101 0.003 0.007 0.003
Polity ¼ 66 11.848 299.798
Polity ¼ 77 2.874 0.447 2.226 0.517 1.614 0.444
Polity ¼ 88 1.378 0.383 0.753 0.461 0.161 0.384
PARCOMP ¼ 0 | 1 0.397 0.227 0.656 0.197
PARREG ¼ 1 | 2 0.446 0.226 0.499 0.226
log of population 0.378 0.042 0.376 0.042 0.369 0.042
Conflict history 2.127 0.181 2.044 0.182 2.052 0.183
Irregular transition 0.735 0.245 0.779 0.245
Chi-square 370.8 383.6 377.8
Df 9 11 10
N 6,103 6,103 6,103
11 Raftery (1995: 133–134) proposes a Bayesian Information Criterion
measure BIC0 to compare the relative degree of support for different
models. The general formula is BIC
0 ¼ w2k0 þ pk lnðnÞ, where w2k0 is the
likelihood ratio test statistic for a model Mk against the null model M0, pk
is the number of degrees of freedom consumed by model k, and n is the
number of observations. The more negative the BIC0, the greater the
evidence for the model over the null. Note that BIC0 penalizes models that
consume more degrees of freedom and adjust for the sample size. The
Bayes factor, or degree of support for one Model A over another Model B,




MB . In this
case, BIC
0
M2¼ 383.6 þ11 ln (6103) ¼ 287.7 and BIC
0
M3¼ 377.8
þ10 ln(6103) ¼ 290.6. The more negative BIC’ value implies that
Model 3 is better supported and that the increase in fit for Model 2 with
the quadratic specification is not commensurate with the additional loss in
degrees of freedom. The difference between the two is above the threshold
of 2 that Raftery (1995: 141) suggests constitutes positive evidence for one
model over the other.
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as ‘anocratic’ in the Polity data often appear to be states where
weak leaders who would prefer to rule in an autocratic manner
try to offer some half-hearted reform in order to strengthen
their position, yet are unwilling to offer reforms that would
suffice to bring about any meaningful form of democratic rule.
We now move from observed irregular transitions to exam-
ine how potential state or leader weakness affects the prospects
for civil war onset. We first consider a two stage approach,
using a measure of the predicted risk of irregular transition
as a covariate. Our approach is based on first estimating the
predicted risk of an irregular transition, based on the data and
model specification in Gleditsch & Choung (2008) as well as
the covariates in the model. In essence, we use features such as
economic performance, regional political characteristics, reli-
gious distributions, previous regime type, and a leader’s time
in office to predict the risk of an irregular transition (see the
web appendix for the full results from the first stage regres-
sions). We then use the predicted linear index from this regres-
sion as a right-hand side covariate in the second regression.
The normal standard errors will not be valid in this second
regression since the linear index for the risk of irregular trans-
fers consists of predicted estimates from the first stage regres-
sion, and we use bootstrapping to obtain standard errors for
the second-stage equation, using 1000 samples with replace-
ment (see Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). Even if our ability
to accurately predict when transitions occur may be limited
(Gleditsch & Choung, 2008; Kuran, 1991), we can see from
Model 4 in Table IV that a higher predicted risk of irregular
transitions is clearly associated with a higher risk of conflict
onset. Hence, the previous results indicating that irregular
transitions increase the risk of civil war cannot simply be dis-
missed as an artifact of endogeneity and reverse causality. The
other results for Model 4 are largely similar to those found for
Model 3. In particular, we continue to find a significant neg-
ative coefficient for the Polity democracy measure.
Given the downsides of predicted regressors and the diffi-
culty of interpreting the effects of time directly in Model 4,
we find it helpful to also consider irregular entry of the current
leader as an ex ante observable indicator for the risk of irregular
transitions. Model 5 in Table IV provides estimates of the risk
of conflict with a term for leaders that have entered irregularly,
the length of their time in office, and an interactive term
between the two. Model 5 indicates a strong positive coeffi-
cient for irregular leader entry, and the magnitude of the coef-
ficient suggests that leaders that have entered power irregularly
are almost three times more likely to experience conflict at the
outset of gaining power than leaders who have assumed power
in regular ways. However, since the model now has an inter-
active term between irregular entry and time in office, the
actual specific impact of irregular entry will depend on the
length of time that a leader has in office. The coefficient esti-
mates for the log of the tenure and the interaction with irregu-
lar entry are both negative, indicating that conflict becomes
less likely over time and that the original effect of irregular
entry decreases over time. Figure 1 illustrates how the pre-
dicted risk of conflict onset varies by type of leader entry and
the length of a leader’s time in office, for a median observation
profile. The grey lines indicate a one standard error confidence
bound for the predicted values. Figure 1 shows that the differ-
ences in risk of conflict onset are very dramatic at the outset of
a new leader, where leaders that have entered irregularly have
an estimated risk of conflict onset almost three times higher
than that of a leader who has entered regularly, everything else
being held constant. The risk of conflict onset generally declines
Table IV. Logit estimates of conflict onset
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
(Intercept) 4.245 0.866 4.869 0.851 4.958 0.854
log of GDP pc 0.271 0.094 0.307 0.085 0.301 0.086
Polity 0.055 0.019 0.044 0.018 0.044 0.018
Polity squared
Polity ¼ 66
Polity ¼ 77 1.735 0.639 2.193 0.465 2.107 0.472
Polity ¼ 88 0.024 0.484 0.216 0.382 0.172 0.386
PARCOMP ¼ 0 | 1 0.558 0.211 0.702 0.199 0.698 0.199
PARREG ¼ 1 | 2 0.623 0.255 0.542 0.227 0.536 0.228
log of population 0.354 0.043 0.378 0.043 0.379 0.043
Conflict history 2.068 0.214 2.020 0.186 2.02 0.186
Predicted risk irregular transition 0.118 0.033
Irregular or aut. trans. 0.334 0.279
Irrgular entry 1.087 0.313 0.972 0.327
log of tenure 0.050 0.108 0.031 0.109
Entry * log tenure 0.386 0.167 0.339 0.171
Chi-square 343.2 394.4 395.7
Df 10 12 13
N 4,983 6,093 6,093
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with tenure, but the net effect once we take into account the
negative interaction between leader entry and time in office sug-
gests that the declining risk of conflict onset with time in office
is much greater for leaders who have entered irregularly. Keep-
ing everything else constant, we find that leaders who have
entered irregularly but manage to hold on to power for over
15 years have a lower estimated risk than leaders who have
entered regularly. The confidence intervals for the predicted
risks of conflict leaders that have entered power irregularly and
those that have entered regularly overlap after about 2,000 days,
or about five and a half years. Although staying in power for
periods as long as this is very uncommon among leaders who
enter regularly, the tails of leaders with very long tenure is much
higher among leaders who have entered irregularly and have
managed to extend their rule beyond the first couple of years.
We omit the term for an irregular transition in Model 5 in
Table IV. Although an irregular transition is not strictly the
same as irregular leader entry, the likelihood of an irregular
transition will generally be much higher for leaders that have
entered irregularly, even if the effect dissipates over time, and
a term for irregular leader entry will capture some of the same
variance. However, when we introduce a term for irregular
leader entry in Model 6, we continue to find a positive effect
for the observed windows where we see irregular transition,
suggesting that the specific time around irregular transitions
still see an increased likelihood of conflict.
Discussion and conclusions
Many studies have examined non-linear specifications of
democracy and civil war to proxy for disparate mechanisms
believed to affect the risk of violent conflict. In this article,
we have shown that it is possible to devise separate measures
of the opportunities for violence that emanate from political
instability and weaker leaders, and the willingness for violence
that stems from restricted opportunities for political participa-
tion and advancing political claims by nonviolent means. Data
on leader changes can be helpful for devising independent
measures of state strength. Periods of leader changes indicate
moments of political opportunities, where potential insurgents
may mobilize and resort to violence. Furthermore, informa-
tion on when leaders enter office as well as how long they have
held office can tell us a great deal about how vulnerable leaders
will be to challenges, either from rebels directly or from other
contenders who can challenge leaders weakened by domestic
dissent. Our results lend strong support to the claim that polit-
ical opportunities, as measured by irregular political leader
changes, indeed appear to be associated with civil war onset.
Moreover, we find that the risk of civil war depends upon fac-
tors influencing the anticipated state weakness as assessed by
the risk of irregular leader changes. Although leaders that have
entered irregularly can encourage civil war onset as they are
more likely to be susceptible to challenges and therefore more
likely to make concessions to insurgents, the risk of civil war
declines with longer tenure. Once we consider these forms
of political weakness, we find that democracy has a clear neg-
ative effect on the risk of civil conflict onset. We take this to
support the conclusion that there probably is nothing about
the institutions of partial democracies per se that make such
states prone to conflict, and that we should shift our attention
to how state weakness may compel autocracies both to intro-
duce half-hearted democratic reforms and provide political
opportunities that may encourage resort to violence.
Replication Data
The analyses reported were conducted in R 2.8.0. The dataset,
codebook, and command files for the empirical analysis in this
article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.
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